In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/bpf-ops: clear bpf_ctx while submitting SQEs
bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes() calls io_submit_sqes() from inside the loop
program, with current->bpf_ctx set, and requests issued inline run with
it set too. The socket code uses has_current_bpf_ctx() to recognize
calls from bpf_setsockopt() and friends, where the caller holds the
socket lock and has already been vetted, and skips both.
So a SOCKET_URING_OP_SETSOCKOPT from the SQ passes sockopt_capable()
without the capability, and runs without lock_sock(). A task with no
capability can set SO_MARK, IP_TRANSPARENT or TCP_REPAIR, and two
threads changing IP_OPTIONS on one socket, one through the ring, double
free in no time. SOCK_DESTROY via IORING_OP_SENDMSG ends up in
tcp_abort() without the lock the same way.
Clear the run context around io_submit_sqes(). The SQEs come from
userspace and must be issued like those of any other ring. They still
run inside the program's RCU tasks trace read section, so a request
that sleeps there holds up that grace period, but other request types
do that already.
Bu kayıt NIST NVD kaynağından aktarılmıştır. Etkilenen sürümler, güncel değerlendirme ve üretici referansları için kaynak kaydı inceleyin.

