CVE-2026-99796

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass

With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel()
until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per
call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled
request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks
past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits
about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.

A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s,
0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup
watchdog fires:

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup – CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100]
RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0
io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170
io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0
__io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110

Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does
for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket.
__io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request
that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.

A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead
of stopping at the match.

Bu kayıt NIST NVD kaynağından aktarılmıştır. Etkilenen sürümler, güncel değerlendirme ve üretici referansları için kaynak kaydı inceleyin.

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