CVE-2026-99550

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: pin owning modules for open debugfs files

The OCFS2 debugfs file operation tables do not set owner. The
full debugfs proxy obtains real_fops with fops_get() at open and
keeps it until final release. Without an owner, this does not acquire
a reference to the module containing the table and its callbacks.
Removing the debugfs entries does not drain retained open files.

An open connected_nodes file can therefore outlive ocfs2_nodemanager
and make full_proxy_release() read real_fops->release from freed
module memory. Heming also reproduced the issue with fs_state and
asked for the other OCFS2 debugfs operation tables to be checked.

Set owner to THIS_MODULE in all eleven explicit debugfs operation
tables: five in ocfs2_nodemanager, four in ocfs2_dlm, and two in
ocfs2. The existing debugfs get/put pair then holds the appropriate
module until final release. Leave the open, read and release callbacks
unchanged. The blockcheck table already sets owner through
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(), so it needs no change.

The original controlled test used an unloadable OCFS2 module and
case-local probe filters without changing the candidate open, unload
or release logic. Closing a retained connected_nodes file after
normal unload produced:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff804cfef
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0xbf/0x190
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__fput+0x39a/0xa60
fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200
__x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Modules linked in: [last unloaded: ocfs2_nodemanager]

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