In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcmtest: handle multiple wraps in random capture fill
The random capture helpers assume that the data generated for one timer
tick wraps the DMA ring at most once. However, b_rw describes 200 ms of
audio because the timer runs at 5 Hz, so it can be several times larger
than a small ring.
For 48 kHz, S16_LE, four-channel capture with a 512-frame buffer, the DMA
ring is 4096 bytes while one tick generates 76800 bytes. After filling the
4096-byte tail, the existing code issues a second 72704-byte write from the
ring base, writing 68608 bytes beyond the ring. Both interleaved and
non-interleaved capture are affected.
KASAN reports the first write into the adjacent free page as a
use-after-free in the random-byte generator. The underlying defect is an
out-of-bounds write from the live DMA ring, not a stale DMA allocation.
Split each random write repeatedly at the interleaved ring or per-channel
block boundary. Keep the hardware-pointer update exactly once after the
complete logical write.
The issue reproduced on three of three clean boots. With this change, the
same vulnerable geometry completed six times without a sanitizer finding.
Boundary, pattern-fill, no-timer, open/close, and module-reload controls
also completed normally.
snd-pcmtest is a test driver, and selecting random fill requires an
administrator-controlled module parameter. The written values come from the
kernel random generator; no privilege escalation or attacker-controlled
write primitive was demonstrated.
Bu kayıt NIST NVD kaynağından aktarılmıştır. Etkilenen sürümler, güncel değerlendirme ve üretici referansları için kaynak kaydı inceleyin.

