CVE-2026-99454

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path

The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:

1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute

length = hdr.len – hdrlen – iv_len;

and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes

datalen = hdr.len – hdrlen – iv_len – icv_len – 8;

for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.

2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame – two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update – before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame
a second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt. Bail out immediately when
decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first.

Discovered by Atuin – Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

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