In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer
svc_defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache
upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq_arg.len –
head[0].iov_len) bytes before head[0].iov_base, a back-up that once
covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit
983084b2672c ("SUNRPC: Remove svc_rqst::rq_xprt_hlen"), so the two
lengths are meant to be equal.
An RPCSEC_GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity
service truncates rq_arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum,
and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq_arg.len short by an
amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token.
Neither adjusts head[0].iov_len. Both lengths are size_t, so the
subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov_base.
Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot.
A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs
as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is
client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another
user's GSS context handle, runs under that identity.
Copy the Call from head[0].iov_base. Refuse to defer a Call whose
length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of
bounds.
Bu kayıt NIST NVD kaynağından aktarılmıştır. Etkilenen sürümler, güncel değerlendirme ve üretici referansları için kaynak kaydı inceleyin.

